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FLUCTUATIONS IN U.S. VOTING BEHAVIOR:
EVIDENCE FROM PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Abstract
The relationship between economic conditions and voting behavior is
evaluated in the context of U.S. presidential elections, 1916-1984. The
approach represents a reapplication of the model employed by Gerald Kramer
(1971) in an earlier study of congressional elections. A critique of the
Kramer model by George Stigler (1973) is reconsidered in this different
context, with application of a Chow test and analysis of the predictive
errors in fact providing strong support for Kramer's basic model. The
systematic explanatory power that is evidenced opposes Sti9ler's claim that
the framework lacks robustness.•
•
FLUCTUATIONS IN U.S. VOTING BEHAVIOR:
EVIDENCE FROM PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
The proposition that voters are influenced by economic conditions has
found the support at least of Richard Nixon, who blames his defeat in the
1960 presidential contest on just such a phenomenon:
"In October, usually a month of rising employment, the
jobless roles increased by 452,000. All the speeches,
television broadcasts and precinct work in the world
could not counteract that one hard fact."
(Nixon, 1962, pp. 310-311)
However, it ;s the pioneering study of congressional elections by
Gerald Kramer (1971) that provides the first major attempt to actually
quantify the extent of economic influences on election outcomes. Kramer's
analysis indicates economic fluctuations (over the year before elections)
account for approximately half the variance of the congressional vote.
Real personal income is found to be the most important here, with changes
in unemployment having no independent effect; presumably due to its being
dominated by the former more comprehensive prosperity measure. An
additional role for the inflation rate, while not found in the original set
of results, is nevertheless suggested in revised estimates--obtained by
Kramer after correction of an error in the data. 1
Kramer's study has in fact initiated a most extensive line of empirical
literature devoted to refining and extending the insights developed for the
analysis of election outcomes. 2 However, notable opposition to Kramer's-2-
approach is voiced by George Stigler (1973), in a critique based on the
sensitivity of the results to the particular definition of variables and
sample period chosen -- a critique which continues "to be more often
referenced than qUestioned.3
1. Set-up of the Model
The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the Kramer specification
contested by Stigler with reference to U.S. presidential elections over the
period 1916-1984.4 Here, the Democratic share of the popular vote in
presidential elections is taken as the dependent variable, with independent
variables being chosen to capture the effects both of economic performanceS
and the possible institutional advantage of incumbency. These factors,
together with random influences, are then seen as resulting in fluctuations
in the party's voting share about the 'normal' long run average vote that
would otherwise be received -- a base vote (V) that is essentially a
measure of the underlying partisanship of the electorate.
We have
•
VOTEt =V + a.PI + ~(I.~t) + ut
where VOTE is the Democratic percentage of the two party vote,
(1)
PI denotes the presidential incumbency dummy, equal to +1 if
there is a Democrat himself standing for re-election, -1 if
there is a Republican, and 0 if else (i.e., no incumbent
standing),-3-
I is an incumbency variable, equal to one for a Democratic
administration, and minus one for a Republican one,
6t is the proportionate change in some economic performance
measure,
a, e, V are parameters of the model,
ut is an error term.
2. The Choice of Economic Variables
Initial estimation of the model is carried out for a basic data set of
economic variables comprising the growth rate of real GNP (G), the change
in the unemployment rate (U), and the growth rate of the GNP deflator, or
inflation rate (P). Further allowance is made for an effect of U.5.
involvement in wars, of changes in the average marginal tax rate (T), and
of labor unrest as measured by the incidence of strikes (5). The influence
of wars is proxied by the change in the ratio of the armed forces to the
total population (AF), as well as by a dummy variable (WAR). With the
exception of WAR -- which is set equal to one if there is a war during the
period of incumbency and zero else -- each variable is defined over one-
and two-year periods prior to presidential elections. For the GNP
variables, Gl and G2 denote the respective growth rates of real GNP over
these one and two year periods. Analogous definitions apply to the
unemployment (Ul and U2), inflation (PI and P2), armed forces (AFI and
AF2), tax (Tl and T2), and strike (51 and 52) variables. Finally, in order
to allow for an influence of very short run economic fluctuations, the
annualized growth rate of real GNP and of the GNP deflator in the second-4-
and third quarters of the election year are added to the variable set --
labeled as G4 and P4 below. 6 Each variable in turn is then included with
the constant and incumbency terms in a succession of OLS regressions. Here
a significant role is found for each of the GNP and unemployment terms, but
none of the other variables is significant in the results presented in
Table 1.7 The best fit is in fact that obtained using the Gl variable,
2
where the R is 0.62. Accordingly the initial selection has Gl as the
economic variable with the greatest individual explanatory power.
However, in order to test for joint significance of more than one
economic variable, a second set of results is obtained. In this case, the
procedure is once again to search over the full range of economic variables
-- this time successively adding each to the specification that already
includes G1. The results in Table 2 show that the inflation rate over the
two year period before each election (P2) is the only variable that is
statistically significant when included with Gl. Meanwhile, Gl remains
highly significant in that regression -- thereby helping to confirm the
initial selection of this variable. For specifications with and without
the statistically insignificant incumbency term we have respectively
VOTE = 0.477 + 0.020 PI + 0.011 I.Gl 0.005 I.P2 (2a)
(0.011) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002)
2
R =0.73 OW =2.32
and
VOTE = 0.473 + 0.012 I.Gl 0.004 I.P2 (2b)
(0.011) (0.002) (0.002)
2
R =0.71 OW =1.95•
-5-
(Standard errors are in parentheses)
It may be noted that the redundancy of further income or unemployment
variables is explained by the high degree of multicollinearity between
these terms. Indeed, Arthur Okun (1973) stresses that over the period
1948-71 the correlation between annual changes in real GNP and annual
changes in the unemployment rate is very close to -0.9 -- ensuring that,
when both an unemployment and a real income variable are used, unstable
coefficients are to be expected. The insignificance of the incumbency term
itself concurs with Kramer's own findings for the congressional case.
However, given its presence in the reported Kramer equations, it is
retained here also for purposes of comparison.8 The expected simularity in
performance to that of the specification with GNP growth and inflation
alone (equation (2b)) is in fact seen to ensue.
3. Analysis with the Income and Inflation Variables
The performance of the model as applied to presidential elections is
addressed through the following examination of its forecasting and
predictive qualities. First, a Chow test is undertaken in order to test
for stability over the sample. 9 The technique employed is to successively
exclude three observations from the sample, with the test --based on the
relative size of the residual errors -- addressing the null hypothesis that
the successive groups of three observations belong to the same structure as
the observations in the remainder of the sample. 10 By testing sequentially
over the full sample, no prior restriction is placed on the period most
likely to feature instability. With e'e denoting the residual sum of-6-
squares over the full 1916-1984 period, and e1'e1 the residual sum of
squares over the restricted period, the test statistic is defined -- for
each set of three excluded observations -- as
where
(e'e - e 'e )/f
1 1 - F
f,T-k
(3)
f refers to the number of observations excluded,
T is the number of observations in the fitted period,
k is the number of explanatory variables.
The full set of test statistics calculated for equations (2a) and (2b) are
reported in Table 3 and confirm the stability of the model. In particular,
there is no evidence of a significant difference between the coefficients
for any sub-period and those of the rest of the sample.
The second method of analysis is then to compare the Democratic vote
share predicted by our two equations to the actual (historical) values.
The results appear in Table 4.
The overall performance of the model can, however, first be summarized
by appeal to the RMSPE (Root Mean Squared Percentage Error) criterion;
respective values of which are 7.32% and 7.79% for equations (2a) and (2b).
Atesoglu and Congleton (1982), in noting "relatively good" post-sample
predictive ability of the original Kramer equations, obtain out-of-sample
values for the RMSPE that vary from 4.90% to 30.37% depending on the
specific time period and equation considered. While the extended
post-sample predictions considered by Atesoglu and Congleton are distinct•
•
-7-
from the election-by-election predictions considered here, this does
nevertheless suggest that the present results for presidential elections
may be considered as having acceptable predictive power.
This viewpoint is supported in examination of the results for the
individual elections, with the errors themselves all within two estimated
standard errors of zero. Although the winner fails to be correctly
identified in three cases under equation (2a) and four under equation (2b),
in each of the elections in question -- 1952, 1960, 1968 and 1976 -- the
victor obtained less than 52.5% of the two party vote. Indeed, the 1960
and 1968 elections were won with less than 50.5% of the vote, and the
failure to forecast the outcome of these particularly close elections may
be set against the relatively small size of the residual errors throughout
the full sample. In the most recent case of 1984, for example, there is an
error of only -.005 for equation (2a) and a zero error for equation (2b).
4. Conclusion
The consistently small predictive errors associated with the model in
fact provide strong evidence that Kramer's approach possesses systematic
explanatory power. When combined with the favorable outcome of the Chow
test that was applied, the results do indeed suggest a strong link between
economic conditions and electoral outcomes. This appears to be the case
with or without the presidential incumbency dummy, despite the limited
reduction in the predictive error provided by its inclusion. While the
relative simplicity of the specifications adopted here is not intended to
imply the non-existence of more complex factors influencing voters, this-8-
very parsimony suffices to flatly contradict Stigler's assertion that
"voters disregard average income experience in deciding between parties"





1. See the Bobbs-Merrill reprint (PS-498).
2. A representative bibliographical listing may be found in Ragsdale
(1983).
3. Although see the comments by Okun (1973).
4. Kramer's own examination of such elections had been limited to the
instance where the coefficient estimates were constrained to be the
same as in the congressional case. Lepper (1974) found this
constraint to be rejected by the data.
5. With an improvement in economic conditions adding to the voting share
where it takes place under a Democratic administration, and detracting
from it where it ensues under a Republican one. (Effect achieved
through multiplication by the incumbency variable, I, in the
specification.)
6. Although, since the quarterly series are available only from 1948, for
earlier years the data for the growth rate over the full one year
period continues to be used following Fair (1978).
7. The regressions with Tl and T2 are limited to a sample of 1916-1980
due to data unavailability for the succeeding period. All other
regressions are over the full 1916-1984 sample.
8. The incumbency dummy employed here differs slightly from that used by
Kramer, which is defined as (1,-1) regardless of whether the incumbent
president is personally standing for re-election. However: for the
presidential election case, the personal incumbency dummy defined
above provides the greater contribution to the goodness of fit.-10-
9. The Chow test is discussed in Johnston (1984, p. 220).
10. Although three elections amount to only a small set of excluded
observations, this number is not exceeded due to the fact that it
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Constant DUl1I1lY Vanable 1< OW
Regression
wi th:
Gl 0.467 0.007 0.010 0.62 1.91
(0.012) (0.016) (0.002)
G2 0.472 0.006 0.009 0.51 2.49
(0.014) (0.019) (0.003)
G4 0.468 0.013 0.009 0.60 1.89
(0.012) (0.016) (0.002)
PI 0.490 0.047 -0.001 0.14 2.06
(0.019) (0.022) (0.003)
P2 0.493 0.052 -0.003 0.17 2.07
(0.018) (0.023) (0.003)
P4 0.484 0.040 0.001 0.14 1.94
(0.018) (0.021) (0.003)
UI 0.472 0.040 -0.019 0.58 1.96
(0.013) (0.014) (0.005) •
U2 0.469 0.043 -0.011 0.51 2.40
(0.014) (0.015) (0.003)
AFI 0.485 0.040 0.023 0.18 2.00
(0.017) (0.020) (0.025)
AF2 0.485 0.041 0.006 0.16 2.01
(0.017) (0.020) (0.009)
51 0.487 0.043 -0.001 0.13 2.01
(0.018) (0.021) (0.012)
S2 0.488 0.044 -0.003 0.14 2.07
(0.018) (0.020) (0.009)
Tl 0.489 0.041 -0.003 0.08 1.96
(0.018) (0.022) (0.009)
T2 0.489 0.040 -0.001 0.08 1.97
(0.018) (0.022) (0.007)
WAR 0.487 0.050 -0.023 0.16 2.06
(0.017) (0.022) (0.030)
(standard errors are in parentheses)-13-
TABLE 2 ,
RESULTS FOR REAL GNP GROWTH IN YEAR OF THE ELECTION (Gl)
TOGETHER WITH A SECOND ECONOMIC VARIABLE




Constant variable ...§L variable If OW
Regression
with:
G2 0.467 0.006 0.009 0.001 0.60 1.96
(0.013) (0.017) (0.004) (0.005)
G4 0.467 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.60 1.89
(0.013) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008)
Pl 0.475 0.015 O.Oll -0.004 0.69 2.20
(0.012) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002)
P2 0.477 0.020 O.Oll -0.005 0.73 2.32
(O.Oll) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002)
P4 0.470 0.008 O.Oll -0.003 0.65 2.22
(0.012) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002)
U1 0.467 0.014 0.007 -0.005 0.60 1.88
(0.013) (0.023) (0.005) (0.011)
U2 0.466 O.Oll 0.008 -0.002 0.60 1.96
(0.013) (0.021) (0.004) (0.005)
• AFJ 0.467 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.60 1.98
(0.012) (0.016) (0.002) (0.018)
AF2 0.467 0.007 0.010 0.001 0.60 1.94
(0.013) (0.016) (0.002) (0.006)
Sl 0.469 0.008 0.010 -0.005 0.61 2.06
(0.013) (0.016) (0.002) (0.008)
S2 0.469 0.008 0.010 -0.003 0.60 1.98
(0.013) (0.016) (0.002) (0.006)
TJ 0.465 0.009 0.010 -0.007 0.61 1.69
(0.013) (0.016) (0.002) (0.006)
T2 0.466 0.007 O.Oll -0.007 0.62 1.80
(0.013) (0.016) (0.002) (0.005)
WAR 0.467 0.015 0.010 -0.035 0.68 2.11
(O.Oll) (0.015) (0.002) (0.019)





RESULTS OF A CHOW TEST FOR
STABILITY OVER THE SAMPLE PERIOD
Observations Excluded Chow Test Statistics
Equation (2a) Equation(2b)
1916 - 1924 0.10 0.14
1920 - 1928 0.77 0.75
1924 - 1932 3.17 0.75
1928 - 1936 2.94 0.58
1932 - 1940 1.49 0.03
1936 - 1944 0.35 0.02 •
1940 - 1948 0.44 0.45
1944 - 1952 0.86 1.03 •
1948 - 1956 1.10 1.51
1952 - 1960 1.07 1.41
1956 - 1964 2.33 3.30
1960 - 1968 2.10 2.95
1964 - 1972 1.91 2.65
1968 - 1976 1.87 1. 65
1972 - 1980 1.84 1.64
1976 - 1984 1. 93 1. 50
Critical values: F3 = 3.49
12





ACTUAL AND PREDICTED DEMOCRATIC SHARE OF THE
TWO-PARTY VOTE IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1916-1984
..
Equation (2a) Equation (2b)
Election
Year t Party in Power Before Election Vote Prediction Error Prediction Error Gl P2
1916 1 D iWilson)* .517 .541 .024 .534 .017 7.9 8.5
1920 2 D Wilson) .361 .354 -.007 .361 .000 -4.4 14.9
1924 3 R (Harding-Coolidge)* .457 .465 .008 .480 .023 -0.2 1.1
1928 4 R (CoolidJe) .412 .469 .057 .465 .053 0.6 -0.2
1932 5 R (Hoover * .591 .561 -.030 .600 .009 -13.8 -9.6
1936 6 D (Roosevelt)* .625 .641 .016 .632 .007 13.7 1.3
1940 7 D (Roosevelt)* .550 .577 .027 .561 .011 7.6 0.7
1944 8 D (Roosevelt)* .538 .556 .018 .543 .005 7.1 3.9
1948 9 D (Roosevelt-Truman)* .524 .490 -.034 .481 -.043 4.1 10.4 I
1952 10 D (Truman) .446 .497 •051 .501 .055 3.7 4.1 ......
(J1
1956 11 R (Eisenhower)* .422 .447 .025 .459 .037 2.1 2.7
I
1960 12 R (Eisenhower) .501 .464 -.037 .456 -.045 2.1 2.0
1964 13 D iKennedY-JOhnson)* .613 .548 -.065 .531 -.082 5.3 1.5
1968 14 D Johnson) .496 .509 .013 .513 .017 4.6 3.8
1972 15 R (Nixon)* .382 .418 .036 .423 .04.1 5.7 4.7
1976 16 R (Nixon-Ford)* .511 .438 -.073 .441 -.070 5.2 7.6
1980 17 D (Carter)* .447 .447 .000 .432 -.015 -0.3 9.3
1984 18 R (Reagan)* .408 .403 -.005 .408 .000 6.8 4.1
* denotes an incumbent president himself standing for re-election.
Gl is the growth rate of real GNP in the year of election.t, and
P2 is the growth rate of the GNP deflator over the two years before election t.
Sources of Data
Vote: 1916-68; Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, part 2, p. 1073.
1972-80; Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1982-83, p. 412.
1984; Congressional Quarterly weeklt
Re~ort, April 13, 1985, p.688.
Gl, P2: 1916-28; Long lerm Economic Growth: 1~0-1 10, pp. 182-183.
1932-76; National Income and Product Accounts of the United States: 1929-76, pp. 1-10.
1980-84; Survey of Current Business, various issues.